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Abstract
This paper investigates the extent of distortions in Russia’s spatial economy that
are inherited from the Soviet system. Using Canada as a benchmark for spatial dy-
namics of economic activity in a market economy, I construct the spatial allocation of
population that would result in Russia, given its initial conditions and existing regional
endowments, in the absence of Soviet location policy. The results show that Siberia
and the Far East were overpopulated by about 14.5 million people by the end of the
Soviet period. Overdevelopment of Siberia comes at the expense of the European area
of the country. This discrepancy persists, even after adjusting the simulated counter-
factual allocation for WWII.
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1 Introduction
Throughout the 20th century Soviet policies moved population and industry en masse from
west to east, from the European area of the country to the regions east of the Urals, the
cold and remote territories. As a result, the geographical allocation of productive resources
in present-day Russia still carries this legacy of Soviet investment decisions.
My goal here is to measure the extent of Soviet distortions on Russian economic geogra-
phy. Qualitatively, we know that Siberia and the Far East are overpopulated compared to
the counterfactual because of the Soviet planning. What we do not know is by how many
people these territories are overpopulated. In order to estimate the size of the Soviet dis-
tortions, it is necessary to know what would have been an undistorted allocation. To that
end, I construct a hypothetical counterfactual allocation of industry and population across
geographical space that would have resulted in Russia if it were developing under market
conditions.
Why does geography matter? The role of geographical endowment in economic devel-
opment is a common topic in the economic literature. Cross-country empirical studies find
a positive association between growth and proximity to other markets, access to seashore,
land quality and mild climate. Gallup, Sachs & Mellinger (1999) conclude that both a hot
climate and location away from the seashore hinder economic performance. As Bloom &
Sachs (1998) point out, the hot climate of Central Africa is responsible for disease trans-
mission and hinders economic development. Rappaport & Sachs (2001) find a present-day
positive productivity premium for U.S. counties located near the seashore and navigable
waterways. Gallup, Gaviria & Lora (2003) investigate a variety of geographical factors that
contribute to developmental inequality in Latin America. Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson
(2001) propose an explanation for developmental inequality that is based on the quality of
institutions, but even in their story the evolution path of institutions is initially determined
by physical geography. Redding & Venables (2004) show the importance of access to foreign
markets for economic growth, and that market access is a function of geographical location.
Still, physical geography is just an endowment. The fixed characteristics of physical
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geography are only constraints on economic activity. People, capital, and technologies are
mobile, they can adjust to these constraints, and so can mitigate their effect. On the other
hand, if geographical endowment is not used efficiently, if these mobile productive resources
are misallocated in the geographical space, then economic losses will occur. Spatial inef-
ficiency not only adds to production costs, but when regional comparative advantages are
not exploited and unnecessary transportation and communication expenditures are incurred,
it also leads to consumption losses. There are extra costs associated with people living in
unsuitable places.
Russian geography is unique in two distinct aspects. The first aspect is physical geography
(e.g. size, climate, location). Russia’s position on the globe can hardly be characterized as
favorable. Climatic conditions are harsh. Resources and population are dispersed over a
vast territory. The few natural transportation routes (rivers, seas) are located unfavorably
for both internal and international trade, leading to the prevalence of costly land transport.
Natural resources, although abundant, are primarily located far from population centers in
the most severe environments with barely any infrastructure. Russia’s size alone is a source
of higher transaction costs: transportation and communications must span greater distances.
All of these factors drive production costs up, leaving Russia at an absolute disadvantage.
The unfortunate geography of Russia and its impact on economic performance have been
noted by Lynch (2002) and Parshev (1999).
The second aspect is the extent of Soviet distortions in the spatial economy. Not only does
Russia have an unfavorable geographical endowment, but it also uses this endowment badly!
With Russia’s large size comes a higher cost of errors: if economic activity is misallocated,
it is more likely to be significantly misallocated and, given Russia’s unfavorable geography,
such misallocations can be costly.1
While Russia’s physical geography cannot be changed, the spatial allocation of indus-
try and people within the country can be. Thus, there is room for appropriate policy for
1The economy that Russia inherited is probably the most distorted among the Newly Independent States,
not only spatially but also structurally. For example, the majority of the defense industry was located in
Russia. Gaddy (1996) puts Russia’s share of the Soviet Union’s defense employment in 1985 at 71.2%, and
the share of the population at 51.8%.
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mitigating both the extent and the direction of Soviet distortions.
In this paper, I estimate a series of location choice models for population and manufac-
turing employment based on Canadian data. Then, using these estimated coefficients and
starting with data on the Russian Empire in 1910, I forecast the regional shares of popula-
tion and manufacturing in the USSR in 1990. That is, I construct a counterfactual path of
regional population (and manufacturing employment) that would have resulted in the USSR
without the distortions of the Soviet planning.
I find that Siberia and the Far East are overpopulated by 14.5 million people (or about
42% of the 1990 population), which comes at the expense of the European part of the country.
I estimate that manufacturing employment in the eastern regions should have been at about
one third of the actual 1990 level. Also, after adjusting for the impact of WWII, I find that
the war cannot explain these differences.
This paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses Russian geography, climate,
and the ideology of Soviet location policies. Section 3 describes the general idea behind my
analysis. Section 4 describes the empirical setting, and section 5 describes the data. Section
6 outlines methodology and discusses estimation issues. Section 7 presents the results, and
section 8 concludes.
2 Russian geography, climate, and history
Russia stands out among other countries not only in its physical geography but even more so
in its population geography: the distribution of people over the territory, and the dynamics
of that distribution over the 20th century. The peculiar fact of the climatic geography of
the Eurasian continent is that winter isotherm lines resemble lines of longitude rather than
latitude. Thus, in the process of populating Siberia and even the Urals, people were moving
across isotherm lines from warmer to colder places (see Figure 1). On the other hand,
summer isotherms look “normal”, so migration to Siberia does not reduce people’s exposure
to summer heat.
Climate and natural resources are not the only factors that are responsible for population
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geography: people settle where better access to markets (higher market potential) gives them
better economic opportunities. People in cold countries – Sweden, Norway, Finland, and
Canada – are concentrated along the seashore and in the south, where temperatures are
relatively mild and access to foreign markets is easiest. In contrast, Siberia loses in terms
of market potential: it is too far from the international trade routes and from the major
historical population centers in Russia itself. The density of population is low, and the cities
are isolated from one another by distance.
Notwithstanding harsh climate and poor market access, the population of Siberia and
the Far East has increased from 5.5% in the Russian Empire in 1910 to about 13% in the
USSR in 1989 (25% of the Russian Federation total). Along with population migration
came industrialization of these regions. Its share of manufacturing employment increased
from 4.8% in the Russian Empire to 12% in the USSR (and 20% within the territory of
modern Russian Federation). Until the very end of the Soviet era, Siberia and the Far East
were the primary destination for investment. Ozornoy (1991) (Table 2, page 386) shows the
regional shares of gross fixed investment in the USSR: the share of the non-European part
of the RSFSR from 1976 to 1988 was between 42 and 44.4% of the Soviet total.
One crude yet persuasive piece of direct evidence that the spatial pattern of Soviet devel-
opment was unusual comes from the dynamics of the temperature per capita (TPC) index,
proposed by Gaddy & Ickes (2001), and discussed extensively in Hill & Gaddy (2003). Ter-
ritorial temperature aggregations are one measure of a country’s climatic endowment, and
TPC describes how this endowment is used. We can define the TPC of country k as:
TPCk =
∑
j
ηjτj, (1)
where ηj is the share of population and tj is the mean temperature in region j. TPC typically
is measured for a given month – in our case, January, the coldest month of the year. Regions
are usually basic administrative units: provinces, oblasts, or states. In essence, TPC is a
countrywide average temperature aggregated over the spatial distribution of population.
Clearly, a country’s TPC is not constant over time. If people migrate from colder to
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warmer places, TPC rises. Thus, a change in TPC is an index of the climate-related effect of
spatial economic evolution. It serves as an aggregate measure of Soviet distortions, because
cold is synonymous with remoteness and low density of population in Russia. TPC dynamics
shows that Russia was cold at the beginning of the century, and it got even colder through
the Soviet years (Figure 2).2 At the same time, market economies were gradually “warming
up”.
Of course, the fact that Eastern parts of Russia had been so aggressively developed during
Soviet times does not by itself prove that this was not economically efficient. Remote regions
should develop even in a market economy if and when technology makes that cost-effective.
Direct comparisons with spatial population patterns in other countries – Canada and parts
of Northern Europe – are illustrative at best. Russia is different: unique economic and
historical factors can potentially provide justification for Siberian development.
Soviet spatial policy: inefficient?
Rodgers (1974) classified ideological principles of Soviet investment policy into three groups:
efficient exploitation of resources, equality in geographical pattern of development, and pri-
ority of military considerations. In terms of geographical location, the first group dictates
a minimization of transportation costs (i.e., locating production near natural resources or
consumers). The second group calls for intensified development of the least industrialized
areas. The third group gives priority to locations farther from international borders, where
production facilities will be safer in the event of war.
All of these ideological principles favor Siberian development. But only the first group
takes into account economic efficiency (to the extent that it was possible in the Soviet planned
economy, where true economic costs were not observed). The only argument in defense of
the Soviet Siberian development might be that it was worth it to locate production closer to
the sources of primary materials.
Dienes (1972) shows that even in terms of Soviet prices, average factor productivity on
the periphery (including Siberia, the Far East, and Central Asia) was lower than in the
2Here Russia refers to the territory in the modern borders of the Russian Federation.
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European parts of the USSR. Thus, we can conclude that there has been overinvestment in
the eastern regions of the USSR. But we still do not know by how much. Certainly, not all
investment in Siberia and the Far East was a waste, given their enormous wealth of natural
resources.
History provides other arguments in favor of Siberian development. At the beginning
of the 20th century, Siberia was already populated and had several major cities. Even
though location fundamentals in Siberia are poor, the path-dependence argument justifies
why economic agents might rationally choose to locate there: to exploit already existing
agglomeration effects, i.e. to be near other agents. Then, WWII destroyed infrastructure in
the western parts of the Soviet Union, and industry shifted to the Urals in the 1940s. This
shift was due in part to political decisions of Soviet authorities, but even without political
pressure we could expect to see a similar effect in any kind of economy.
Migration trends during the transition period were the opposite of what happened in
Soviet times. This again suggests that the Eastern regions were “overdeveloped”, but it is
neither a conclusive test nor a measure of overdevelopment. There was no theoretical reason
for misallocations to reverse themselves after the Soviet period ended, because of the path-
dependence of spatial evolution. Agglomeration effects continued to work in Siberian cities.
Furthermore, a multitude of factors affect intensity of migration flows in the short-run. For
example, a poorly performing region may be locked in a poverty trap: people are credit
constrained and poor and thus unable to move out (Andrienko & Guriev (2004) proposed
this explanation for the low mobility of residents in depressed Russian regions). Although
negative net migration can pinpoint the most evident regional problems, it cannot show the
degree of Soviet distortions.
Thus, although there is evidence that Siberia and the Far East were overdeveloped,
the extent of the Soviet distortions is not clear. Regional endowments and the unique
historical circumstances specific to Russia/USSR must be factored in to create an interesting
counterfactual.
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3 Idea
My idea is to construct a counterfactual that uses Canadian behavior as a benchmark for
the spatial dynamics in a market economy, but to apply it to Russian initial conditions
and endowment. Using Canadian data, I estimate a model that characterizes the dynamic
links between spatial structure of the economy, on the one hand, and initial conditions and
regional characteristics, on the other hand. This model is then applied to Russia to produce
the counterfactual “market” allocation.
My main concern is the impact of Soviet location policy on the economic geography of
the Russian Federation, primarily on Siberia and the Far East. However, for the most of
the century Russia had been a part of the common market of the Soviet Union. In order
to correctly account for the possibility of interregional migration, the projections must be
applied to the territory of what was the Russian Empire, then the Soviet Union, and now
the Newly Independent States.3 Figure 3 shows the administrative borders for the territory
of the former Russian Empire and the former USSR (for the list of provinces, see Tables 7
and 8).
I am particularly interested in the joint allocation of population and footloose industry
over the territory. Soviet authorities did not just develop mining operations in Siberia,
they also built manufacturing facilities there. Clearly, sectors that exploit regional resource
endowments are allocated similarly in any kind of economy. Agriculture develops where land
is fertile for crops or for livestock. Mining is located at the sites of natural resource deposits.
Because manufacturing is a priori mobile, to measure missallocations my counterfactual
has to account for the factors that drive the regional allocation of manufacturing as well as
population.
3In different times the term “Russia” referred to different territorial entities. Prior to 1917, Russia was the
Russian Empire. During Soviet times, “Russia” was an official short name for the Russian Soviet Federated
Socialist Republic – a part of the Soviet Union. After the breakup of the USSR, Russia became a synonym
for the Russian Federation - one of the Newly Independent States. The balanced panel dataset that I work
with covers all of the regions that were part of both the Soviet Union and the Russian Empire, and goes
beyond the borders of the modern Russian Federation.
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Why Canada?
Canada is the obvious choice for a benchmark because there is no other country in the world
closer to Russia in climate and size.4 Both economies possess and export abundant natural
resources. More importantly for the discussion of spatial population dynamics, both were
frontier countries at the beginning of 20th century. Both countries possess vast undeveloped
amounts of land. And, throughout history, Russia was expanding eastward and Canada was
colonizing its west.
The turn of the 20th century was marked by the construction of transcontinental railroads
in both countries at nearly the same time (completed in 1885 in Canada and in 1905 in the
Russian Empire). In both countries, the railroad (and a sharp decline in transportation costs
that ensued) facilitated a wave of migration to the frontier territories. In Canada from 1901
to 1911, the population of Saskatchewan and Alberta quadrupled, ehile British Columbia’s
doubled. During the next decade these three provinces grew in population by 50% more (or
by nearly half a million people overall). At the same time, the population of the Siberian
provinces grew by 50-60%, or by about 2 million people from 1897 to 1910.5
At that time, both countries were still predominantly agricultural. The 1901 Census of
Canada places 42% of the labor force in agricultural occupations, 17.3% in manufacturing,
and 1.6% in mining. According to the 1897 Census the Russian Empire was somewhat less
industrialized, with 55% in agricultural occupations, 14% in manufacturing, and 0.6% in
mining.6 The sectoral structure of the economy determined the nature of migration. In both
countries railroad construction made vast spaces of unused agricultural land attractive to
migrants.
The distinctive feature of the Canadian economy is its close ties to the US, both a
4Canada is similar to Russia not only in climate, but also in the share of its territory north of the Arctic
Circle.
5We have to keep in mind that the Russian frontier was much better populated, even prior to the railroad
construction. In 1897 the population of Siberia was about 6.5 million people, practically the size of Canada’s.
6A statistical summary in the “Yearbook of Russia, 1910” gave an approximate estimate of 75% of
population in agriculture, but this figure includes all the family members of agricultural workers. Canadian
censuses traditionally did not record the dependents of farmers as gainfully employed. Therefore, to make
a valid comparison between two countries I cite the occupation shares in the Russian labor force, i.e. only
among the people who listed a primary occupation in the 1897 census. Only 55% of them were agricultural
workers.
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friendly neighbor and a large market. In general Canada is in a better position for both
internal and international trade than Russia because of its natural water transportation
routes and good access to oceans. But the Russian Empire was also in a position to benefit
from a large neighboring market: Europe. Of course, the Russian Empire (and, later the
Soviet Union) shared borders with an extremely diverse set of countries, and relationships
with European neighbors were uneasy at times. At the beginning of the century the major
trading partners of the Russian Empire were Germany and United Kingdom. On the other
hand, the prevalence of land transport in Russia makes shipping distances very costly. It is
not clear whether being closer to the western border in Russia yields a stronger or weaker
trade advantage than being close to the U.S. border in Canada.
One marked difference between the two countries is in GDP per capita. At the turn of
the 20th century, an average Canadian was 2 times richer than an average Russian.7 This
difference is crucial to the extent that income affects the mobility of capital and labor. One
might argue that because of higher income, the Canadian population was better equipped
to take advantage of migration opportunities. Indeed, population mobility in Canada today
is higher than in the Russian Federation today, and it was somewhat higher (in proportional
terms, but not in total numbers) at the beginning of 20th century. Still, endowing “coun-
terfactual Russians” with high “Canadian mobility” provides more, not less, justification for
the migration from the traditional core to the periphery of the country. If anything, I risk
underestimating Soviet distortions.
There are two marked differences in the factors that drove spatial evolution of the econ-
omy in Canada versus Russia. WWII affected the spatial structure of the Soviet economy
enormously, but there is no precedent for such an impact in Canadian history. Another issue
is regional diversity. The regions of the Russian Empire (or the Soviet Union) are more di-
verse than Canadian regions with respect to ethnic composition, human capital, and culture.
Cultural differences, most notably traditional differences in fertility rates, had a greater ef-
fect on regional shares of the population in the USSR than in Canada. However, I do not
believe that this is crucial for my results, because the regions I am primarily interested in
7Amazingly, this proportion is exactly the same for 2009 World Bank PPP estimates!
10
– Russian Federation and especially Siberia – are more homogeneous than the USSR as a
whole.
In the following sections, I estimate an empirical model of spatial dynamics of population
and industry on Canadian regional data. The equations link regional population growth to
past population, industry, and various location characteristics. Then, the equations bearing
the fitted values of the coefficients are applied to the Russian Empire’s regional data on the
initial (beginning of the century, before the October Revolution) population and industry
and the same set of regional characteristics. The result of the projections is the counter-
factual allocation – specific to the Russian starting point and geographical characteristics,
but obtained using the dynamic relationship fitted on a market economy. This procedure
is described in greater detail in Section 6. In section 7.4, I correct these projections for the
impact of WWII and fertility differences.
Thus, I am assuming not that the spatial structures of different market economies should
be similar, but rather that the dynamic forces that affect location choices should be similar.
In other words, I do not simply compare the existing spatial allocations in Russia and
Canada, but rather look at the changes in structure over time: initial conditions matter.
4 The general framework
There are two basic approaches to modeling location choice. As the rule, the location choices
of firms are modeled as a decision to enter one of several possible markets: a firm does not
have a location a priori. The location choices of people (termed migration) are modeled as
a decision to change ones’s existing location: the choices of agents and the outcome together
depend on the initial regional population structure. I discuss both approaches in greater
detail below .
4.1 Location of industry
Carlton (1983) was the first to apply McFadden (1974)’s multinomial logit framework to the
industrial location choice problem. Since then, this framework has been widely used for the
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estimation of regional industrial structure models.
Consider a specific industry consisting of many small firms that are deciding where to
locate among a finite number of regions. Let pijl be the profit of firm j in region l. Firms
maximize profits, so if firm j locates in region r, then ∀l, pijr ≥ pijl. Assume that a firm’s
profit function in a region is a combination of the region-specific component common to all
firms and the random shock that is specific to the firm and region. Formally:
pijl = p˜il + ²jl. (2)
Common component p˜il encompasses all of the characteristics of region l that make it at-
tractive to firms on average. Random variable ²jl captures the attractiveness of region l
that is specific to firm j. In essence, it represents the “quality of the match” between j and
l: ceteris paribus a positive shock raises j’s profit from being in region l; a negative shock
decreases it.
If we further assume that ²jl follows Gumbel law, with cdf F (²) = exp(exp(−²)), then
the probability that firm j chooses location r is given by the logit function:
Pjr =
exp(p˜ir)∑
l exp(p˜il)
. (3)
Let Indr be the total number of firms in region r and Ind be the total number of firms in the
industry, Ind =
∑
r Indr. As the total number of firms in the industry increases, regional
shares Sindr =
Indr
Ind
converge to probabilities (3). Thus, by taking logs and differencing, we
obtain:
ln Indr − ln Indl = lnSr − lnSl = p˜ir − p˜il. (4)
To obtain an equation to estimate, one needs to specify the average regional profit func-
tion p˜ir, but the profit function is dictated by the question under being considered. To
construct industrial concentration indices, Ellison & Glaeser (1997) consider a simple two-
component additive form: one component is a composite of all natural advantages of location,
the other reflects spillovers that arise from co-locating with other firms. The majority of em-
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pirical studies of the determinants of FDI or domestic industrial location use linear hedonic
specifications. (For a recent survey, see Arauzo-Carod, Liviano-Solis & Manjo´n-Antol´ın
(2010).)
Head & Mayer (2004) derive the regional profit function from a theoretical New Economic
Geography model. They show that up to a monotonic transformation, the profit function
is linear in real market potential and marginal cost. These variables in turn depend on the
location of the region, regional incomes and factor prices, and total factor productivity.
Thus I assume that the profit function is linear in the observable regional characteristics
and unobservable component:
p˜ir =
n∑
k=1
αkt x
k
r + δr. (5)
Then,
ln Indr − ln Indl =
n∑
k=1
αkxkr −
n∑
k=1
αkxkl + δr − δl. (6)
Assume that δr are zero-mean normal random variables. Then ξr = δr − δl are also normal
with zero mean. Because regional shares must sum to one, only n − 1 equations (4) can
be written for n regions (one degree of freedom is lost). Choosing region l as a common
numeraire and collecting common terms into a constant, the equation to estimate is:
ln Indr = α
0 +
n∑
k=1
αkxkr + ξr. (7)
If firms are small and a priori identical, then regional levels of industrial employment
are approximately proportional to regional firm counts Indr. In this paper, I consider the
location of manufacturing and measure Indr by manufacturing employment in the region.
4.2 Population migration
In the literature population migration is traditionally modeled at the level of bilateral inter-
regional flows. Person j who lives in region h maximizes utility u over a set of regions and
decides to migrate to region r if ∀l, ujhr ≥ ujhl. The set of possible choices l includes the
home region (the option to stay); regional utility ujhl includes the cost of moving from h to
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l (zero for ujhh). Thus, the decision to migrate depends on the characteristics of both the
source and destination regions, and choice sets are different for residents of different regions.
As for industrial location choice, assume that individual shocks are additive and Gumbel-
distributed:
ujhl = u˜hl + ²jhl. (8)
The share of the population of region h who migrate to r is:
Mhr =
exp(u˜hr)∑
l exp(u˜hl)
. (9)
The population of region h is the sum of those who stayed and those who came from the
other regions, and it depends on the initial population distribution (indexed by 0).
Poph = Pop
0
h
exp(u˜hh)∑
r exp(u˜hr)
+
∑
l 6=h
Pop0l
exp(u˜lh)∑
r exp(u˜lr)
. (10)
Thus the regional share of population depends on the initial shares and characteristics of all
regions. Interregional migration flows have a simple analytical form, but aggregate shares of
population do not. The general model is intractable.
Assuming away the cost of moving simplifies the model. If mobility is costless, then ∀l, r,
u˜lh = u˜rh = u˜h, and equation (10) reduces to the multinomial logit expression:
Poph =
∑
l
Pop0l
exp(u˜h)∑
r exp(u˜r)
= Pop
exp(u˜h)∑
r exp(u˜r)
(11)
As in the industry case, under an assumption that regional utility is a linear function of
regional characteristics, equation (11) is transformed into:
lnPopr = β
0 +
n∑
k=1
βkxkr + ηr. (12)
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4.3 Explanatory variables
As a general rule, with forecast models the set of explanatory variables must be small for
the forecast to be meaningful and robust. On the other hand, the set must be rich enough
to capture the basic trends of regional growth through the 20th century in Canada. There
are four main considerations in choosing this set.
First, the set of regional factors must be restricted to those available for as early as 1910
for the Russian Empire, for all of the Soviet period, and for all of the decades from 1911
until 1991 for Canada. The data also must be comparable between two countries.
Second, to capture history-dependence of location choices, I include past levels of depen-
dent variables. Choices of people and firms are interdependent: firms locate where people
are, and people migrate toward jobs. Accordingly, past levels of population and manufac-
turing employment enter the set of right-hand-side variables in each equation. Thus, the
estimated equations are linked recursively.
Third, I use only exogenous regional characteristics. Many of the factors that are clearly
important for migration (regional wage and income differentials, housing prices, unemploy-
ment) or for industrial location (intra-and inter-industry spillovers) themselves depend on
the regional allocation of population and industry. Note that we cannot observe what any of
these endogenous variables would have been in the “counterfactual USSR.” Thus, to be used
in the forecast, they would have to be predicted first, which would make the model overly
complicated.8
Finally, the variables must reflect the main factors of interest. Was exploration of natural
resources in remote regions followed by growth of population and manufacturing? Did pop-
ulation or manufacturing employment grow faster when in close proximity to international
borders and trade routes? How strong is persistence in regional population shares and shares
of mobile industry? Does industrialization (growth of the manufacturing sector) drive pop-
8A similar issue arises with respect to man-made infrastructure and natural resource exploration. Both
are obviously important for location decisions and endogenous to population. I use 10-year lagged values
for all of the variables that describe man-made infrastructure and development of natural resources, which
changed throughout the course of the 20th century. For the counterfactual forecast, I take Soviet development
decisions as given and use them as inputs for the forecast.
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ulation into the region? To answer these questions, the set of xr has to include information
on natural resources, geographical location, past levels of population, and manufacturing
employment.
As shown in the work of Head & Mayer (2004) on industrial location, Crozet (2004) on
migration, and H. Hanson (2005) on regional real wages, real market potential (RMP) is an
important factor that attracts firms and population. RMP is a theory-based composite mea-
sure of how large the demand for local goods is, and it takes into account trade costs, average
income, and prices in all other markets that can be reached from a given location. Including
the precise theoretical formulation of RMP into the set of xr would make model specification
too complicated for the forecast, but factors that proxy for RMP must be included. Past
levels of population and manufacturing proxy for the size of regional market; geographi-
cal variables (for example, closeness to the international border or port) and infrastructure
characteristics (such as railroads) proxy for low trade costs (good market access).
Models of population migration normally include labor market factors (real income or
wages, unemployment), and quality-of-life indicators (housing prices, climate, amenities).
For the purposes of a forecast, endogenous variables (wages, prices, unemployment) must
be expressed as functions of the observed exogenous regional characteristics. Variables that
reflect natural advantages in terms of quality-of-life (mild climate, waterways) would tend
to lower the local real wage, while variables that proxy for high RMP would tend to increase
wages.
The resulting set of explanatory variables includes: past levels of population and man-
ufacturing employment as well as a vector of the regional characteristics of climate and
geography, natural resources and land endowment, and man-made transport infrastructure.
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Estimated equations
The resulting estimation equations link regional levels of population and manufacturing
employment with their lagged values and a variety of regional characteristics:
ln Indrt = α
0
t + α
Pop
t Popr,t−1 + α
Ind
t Indr,t−1 +
n∑
k=1
αkt x
k
rt + ξrt, (13)
lnPoprt = β
0
t + β
Pop
t Popr,t−1 + β
Ind
t Indr,t−1 +
n∑
k=1
βkt x
k
rt + ηrt. (14)
Variable t indexes time. There are 8 time periods; length of the time period is 10 years,
the lag of the census data at the beginning of the 20th century in Canada. Year 1911 is a
starting point (t = 0). Thus, 1921 manufacturing and population are expressed as functions
of 1911 data, 1931 as functions of 1921, etc up to 1991. In general, I allow parameters α
and β to be different in different time periods, reflecting the fact that the nature of spatial
dynamics can change through time.
Estimated parameters αˆkt , βˆ
k
t together with data on the initial regional levels of population
and manufacturing in the 1910 Russian Empire and the characteristics of Russian/Soviet
regions, are then used to construct a forecast of regional shares of population and industry
in the counterfactual USSR around 1990.
Section 5 describes the data, and Section 6 discusses the empirical strategy in more detail.
5 Data
For Canada the dataset is a panel with 9 time points: one population census year per decade
from 1911 to 1991. For any given year, the data on regional population, manufacturing
employment, and other regional characteristics are compiled (see Table 1 for details). These
same data are collected for the Russian Empire for 1910 — the starting cross-section for the
counterfactual forecast. For some explanatory variables the data also are collected for the
USSR for each decade until 1990, and they serve as inputs for the forecast. The final Soviet
population (1989) and industrial (1988) censuses are then used for comparing the actual
allocation with the counterfactual one that is obtained.
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5.1 Spatial units of analysis
The choice of the geographical unit for the analysis is dictated by availability of data. The
smallest unit of geographical aggregation for the manufacturing data that is available for the
Russian Empire is “gubernia” or “oblast” (“province” is a most suitable name equivalent), a
basic administrative unit. There were 98 administrative units in the Russian Empire in 1910.
But only those territories that later belonged to the Soviet Union are included in this sample.
Eighteen provinces that were in Poland and Finland, and Karsskaya province that is now a
part of Turkey, are excluded. Separate data for Kamchatka oblast and Zakatalskii okrug do
not exist, so they are included in Primorskaya and Tiflisskaya provinces respectively. The
result is 79 regions. Figure 3 shows a map of the administrative divisions in the Russian
Empire, together with the borders of the USSR and the present day borders of the Russian
Federation.
One crucial step of this analysis is constructing comparable spatial units (regions) for
Canada, because Canadian provinces are too big when compared to Russian ones. I took
the data reported at the Canadian census district level and combined census districts into
artificial geographical units similar to Russian ones. The main difficulty here stems from the
fact that census districts were changing over time as the Canadian territory was gradually
developed and populated. The census of 1911 had fewer and larger by area districts. Wher-
ever large 1911 districts were later divided up, I had to combine districts for the later years
in order to maintain the panel. Most of the sparsely populated territories – northern parts
of Prairie Provinces, Yukon, North-West Territories, mountains of British Columbia – were
single-district territories in 1911.
Districts located in the densely populated Canadian South were also sometimes revised.
On several occasions, the new and old districts overlapped significantly. In these cases,
I typically merged overlapping districts. The exception was several districts in Northern
Quebec that were revised several times throughout the century. The boundary changes
were significant there, but the overlaps covered territory that had extremely low population
density. In these cases, I counted a new district in the same geographical unit where the
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largest city of the district had been located. I do not believe that significant error was
introduced in the process, because the overlaps covered only small distant villages.
Next, I merged the geographical units to construct a set of regions that would closely
resemble Russian imperial administrative units in both size and spatial pattern. Provinces
in Russia are mainly formed around an urban center. In Eastern Siberia and the Far East,
administrative borders follow the topography of the terrain. Provinces in the European part
of the Russian Empire were smaller and had higher population density. In Central Asia,
Siberia, and the Far East, the provinces are large and sparsely populated. Where possible,
I applied similar principles to Canadian districts.
Generally, I combined small districts (counties) in southern Ontario, southern Quebec,
Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick so that, where possible, each division covered a large
or mid-size city and the counties around it. Districts in the Prairie Provinces often are
rectangular, and they can be divided naturally into southern, middle, and northern parts,
with a large or mid-size city in each.9
The result was 38 regions constructed from 227 census districts in 1911 Canada.
5.2 Population and manufacturing employment
The population data for pre-revolutionary Russia come from the “Yearbook of Russia, 1910.”
For manufacturing employment data, I used the reports of the 1908 census of industry which
give the number of people employed in manufacturing enterprises with 5 or more employees.10
The data for population and manufacturing employment for the pre-transition Soviet
Union were taken from the Population Census of 1989, and the Census of Industry, 1988.
Both employment and population data are available at the level of basic geographical ag-
gregation (by raion). The raion-level data were regrouped to the boundaries of the pre-
revolutionary provinces.
9Where districts can be combined objectively in different ways, I tried each of the combinations. The
estimation results are not sensitive to the particular choices.
10Another source of data on manufacturing employment in the Russian Empire is the report on peoples’
occupations by province, published in “The Yearbook of Russia, 1910.” The number of people reported to
be in manufacturing, mining and crafts is somewhat higher than counted by the census of industry, because
self-reported occupations include people in small establishments. The results are robust to the choice of data
source; the difference is a fraction of a percentage point.
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The main sources of data for population and manufacturing employment are the Cen-
suses of Canada for each decade from 1911 to 1991. For 1921-1931, census publications
give industry data only for cities with populations greater than 15,000, but not for census
districts. These years were dropped from the sample for the industry equation and were
replaced by 1911 data in the population equations for 1931 and 1941. Data for the year 1981
are not included in census publications, but are available from “Manufacturing Industries of
Canada: Geographical Distribution,” Regional and Small Business Statistics Section, Man-
ufacturing and Primary Industries Division, Statistics Canada, 1982. Unfortunately, due to
confidentiality issues, several small mono-industrial census districts are not listed. Thus, the
quality of data for 1981 is substantially lower.
5.3 Regional characteristics
The regional characteristics used for the estimations (for Canadian regions) and for forecast-
ing (for Russian regions) are summarized in Table 1.
Area , temperature, agricultural land quality, having a port, and distance to the prime
city all represent the inherent characteristics of a region: size, climate, quality of soils,
accessibility, and remoteness. If the region is not landlocked, then the largest city is usually
a port, so the “Port” variable also can be considered inherent to geographical location. These
variables do not change from period to period.
Railroads and trade route are characteristics of not only the location (accessibility) of a
region, but also the level of infrastructure development. Because the structure of a railroad
network is changing over time and is endogenous to the population distribution, it is imper-
ative to use the lagged number of railroads in the Canadian regressions. I also use the actual
dynamics of Soviet railroad network development as an input for the forecast, because it is
obviously impossible to know where railroads would be built in a counterfactual world. By
doing so, I am implicitly assuming that Soviet infrastructure investments were rational from
the market economy point of view (even though there are obvious reasons to suspect that
they were not). This may introduce bias “in favor” of the Soviet development pattern, but
the results show that Siberia is overpopulated nonetheless.
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Variable Description
Area Land area, sq. km.
Temperature Average January temperature in the largest city in a region,
◦C.
Distance to the
prime city
Direct (straight line) distance from the largest city in a region
to Toronto or Moscow.
Railroads Number of railroad branches leading from the largest city in
a region.
Coal mining 1, if a significant amount of coal was mined.a
Metals mining 1, if a significant amount of any metal ores were mined.
Oil extraction 1, if a significant amount of oil was extracted.
Timber cutting 1, if at least 1/3 of the territory is covered with forest and a
significant amount of logging was taking place.
Port 1, if the largest city is a port. Included are Canadian ports
on the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, on Great lakes, and on St.
Laurence river, and Russian ports on all seas and the Caspian
lake.
Trade route 1, if there is a direct (not through some other region) trans-
portation route (road, railroad, or waterway) abroad.
Agricultural
land
1, if at least 1/3 of the land is classified as “having no major
obstacles for agriculture.” For Canada, corresponds to land
type A and B in the agricultural lands classification.
Urbanization % of urban population in a region in 1911
a For natural resources (coal, metals, oil, and timber) “significant” means that the region is
a net exporter of the resource.
Table 1: Regional Characteristics
21
Presence of a trade route is treated as exogenous, since all the routes connecting Canada
and US are traditional transport routes and were formed prior to the beginning of the century.
The same is true for the USSR and its transport connections with the neighbors.
Natural resources endowments are characterized by four variables: presence of coal mining
operations; presence of oil extracting operations; presence of any metal mining operations;
and presence of timber resources. All of these are dummy variables indicating only the
presence of active resource-extracting operations in a region. To track changes in mining
operations and to avoid possible endogeneity, the dummy variables vary with time, and the
lagged values are used. The sources of data for Canada are statistical yearbooks (inter-
provincial trade) and natural resource maps. For the USSR, they are natural resource maps
and various Soviet public historical news records.
The choice of dummies is a compromise. The truly relevant factors for the population
or industry growth in a region are the potential economic profits that could be obtained
either from natural resources or land, or the value of positive externalities provided by the
existing infrastructure or favorable location. Characterization of these factors by the use of
dummy variables is certainly a simplification of reality, but unfortunately it is necessary. I
had to choose regional characteristics bearing in mind that data for both Canada and the
Russian Empire (or the USSR) had to be collected. Using more informative measures for
a region’s natural resource endowment (the amount of extractable resources, for example),
its land value and infrastructure was possible for Canada, but comparable information on
Russian/Soviet regions does not exist in the public domain,11 or at all. Only simple dummy
variables can be constructed using open sources, including maps and statistical publications.
6 Empirical strategy
This section describes the selection of the best forecast model used with the Canadian data,
the estimation and the forecast procedure in detail. Any forecast problem involves model
selection: that is, choosing a subset from the set of potentially relevant explanatory variables.
11For example, estimates of extractable natural resources were USSR state secrets.
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Because I have a series of recursive forecast equations, the choice of the correct model
is crucial. The next subsection describes the estimation procedure for any given model
specification.
6.1 The procedure
Step 1 Estimate the selected dynamic panel model for Canada to obtain the fitted values of
the model parameters.
I estimate the system of equations (13) and (14) on the Canadian panel data. For a
specific selected model, restrictions on the parameters are imposed accordingly. Examples
of such restrictions are: αkt = 0 if factor k is excluded from the equation for period t, or ∀t,
αkt = α
k if the coefficient before factor k is restricted to be constant over time.
Because data on regional manufacturing in Canada are missing for 1921 and 1931, they are
replaced by 1911 data in the population equations for 1931 and 1941 and in the manufacturing
equation for 1941. Alltogether I have eight equations to estimate for population and six for
manufacturing. If all parameters are decade-specific, the dynamic panel model breaks down
into period-by-period equations. Nevertheless, they are estimated as one system because
equations (13) and (14) represent seemingly unrelated regressions. The error terms for
industry and population in the same region and the same time are likely to be correlated:
a positive shock to the region’s population is likely to coincide with a similar shock to
manufacturing employment.
Step 2 Project the estimated relationship onto Russian/Soviet data.
The forecast is recursive. Beginning with the actual data for population and industry in
1910, I use the population equation for 1921 to calculate the projected population in 1921.
Then, with the projected 1921 population and the 1910 actual industry data I obtain the
projected population for 1931, and repeat the procedure for 1941. Industry in the year
1941 is a function of 1931 projected population and 1910 actual industry data. For each
decade from 1951 until 1991, projected population and industry are computed using the
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estimated coefficients and the projected population and industry from the previous decade.
The first two projection equations for the population and industry (regional index is omitted,
F indexes forecasted values) are:
lnPopRusF1921 = β
Rus
1921 + βˆ
pop
1921 lnPop1911 + βˆ
ind
1921 ln Ind1911 +
∑
k
βˆk1921x
k
1911, (15)
ln IndRusF1941 = α
Rus
1941 + αˆ
pop
1941 lnPop1931 + αˆ
ind
1941 ln Ind1911 +
∑
k
αˆk1921x
k
1911. (16)
This procedure is repeated until the year 1991.
Note that the constant terms βRust and α
Rus
t are not equal to the intercepts in the equa-
tions (13) and (14), respectively, estimated on the Canadian data. In multinomial logit
models the shares of different regions must sum to one, so one degree of freedom is lost to
that additional condition. When projecting the model onto Russia, and properly calculating
the relative shares of all the provinces, we need to account for that loss. Therefore, the values
of βRust and α
Rus
t can be obtained from the condition:
∑79
l=1 POP
RusProj
l,t = POP
RusActual
t ,
where POPRusActualt is actual total population of the Soviet Union in year t.
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Next, I use the projected 1921 values to obtain projections for 1931, and so on until
1991. The 1991 results present an alternative spatial allocation for Russia that would have
occurred if its development followed the Canadian path. This is the counterfactual allocation
I sought: it is free of the shocks and disadvantages that are specific to Soviet history.
This procedure also can be applied to the Canadian data for 1911, to obtain projected
values for 1991 and to compare them with the reality, using a chosen criterion. This is one
way to evaluate the quality of the model. I discuss other model selection issues below.
6.2 Model selection
Different choices of explanatory variables and other restrictions on the coefficients in esti-
mated equations(13) and (14) lead to different forecasted counterfactuals. As with single-
equation models, it seems that the specification that provides the best fit for each individual
12It is not necessary to obtain the value of the constant term for each year. Since the relationship between
past and present population (or industry) is linear in logs, the constant added to all the observations does
not change the relative “weight” of different regions. Only the terminal-year constant term is of interest.
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period does not necessarily provide the best overall forecast.
Forecast model is commonly selected by the quality of out-of-sample fit or by informa-
tion criteria. Out-of-sample forecasts are not feasible here, because there is no alternative,
parallel-world Canada on which to test the performance of a forecast model. Nor is it possi-
ble to split the sample of Canadian regions into a fictitious “in-sample” and “out-of-sample”
either: the sample is small, the regions are diverse, and any single sub-sample would not be
representative.
Information criteria can be used to resolve the trade-off between too many and too few
explanatory variables in small samples: additional variables improve goodness-of-fit but
also may “over-explain” realized shocks, resulting in biased coefficients and poor predictive
qualities. In the case discussed here, the forecast is recursive, and it is not clear whether the
model selected by the information criteria works well overall. This is because the forecast
errors accumulate.
When I use the predicted values of population and industry as inputs for the next-
period forecast, the errors for the same region in different periods can either accumulate or
cancel each other out. Indeed, a common issue in cross-country or regional panel models
is autocorrelation in the residuals in the time dimension.13 Certain persistent factors that
affect location and are not included in the set of explanatory variables can generate positive
autocorrelation of the residuals in the Canada panel. And, if the residuals are positively
correlated, then the recursive forecast accumulates and inflates the errors that have occurred
over time.
One way to deal with persistent omitted variables in structural panel models is with
individual (fixed or random) effects that allow us to estimate parameters correctly. In this
analysis, the individual effects are useless: they cannot be used for the forecast, because they
are not observed for the USSR. Also, I am not interested in unbiased estimation of structural
parameters; I am interested in projections. The forecast, which is a linear projection, is
unbiased under the central assumption that both observable and unobservable factors would
have affected location decisions in the same way in the “counterfactual USSR” and in Canada.
13See Islam (1995) for the discussion of the common estimation issues in panel models of growth.
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I can instead use in-sample forecast criteria for model evaluation. Based on the estimated
model, I predict regional population in Canada in 1991 via the recursive procedure from the
1911 population, manufacturing, and regional characteristics. I then compare this 1991
estimate with the actual data using a chosen criterion. For example, for model selection I
might use (A indexes actual values, F - forcasted):
• Minimum sum of relative squared errors (relative SSE): ∑r (POPAr,1991−POPAr,1991POPAr,1991 )2 .
• Minimum sum of absolute squared errors (absolute SSE):∑r (POPAr,1991 − POP Fr,1991)2.
I select the model (chosen set of variables) that gives the best result according to one of
these criteria.
I chose “relative SSE” as the criterion for the main model, because it seems to yield best
results in terms of the spatial dynamics in Canada. Because the main focus of this paper
is the population of the Russian east, I must make sure that the model predicts population
growth in peripheral regions properly. The model that minimizes relative SSE is selected to
fit regions irrespective of their population with equal weights. Absolute SSE yields a model
that fits the populous metropolitan areas better. For my purposes, the relative SSE criterion
is a better choice.
Ideally, the search for the best model would involve estimating the projected Canadian
population for all possible models, and then selecting the model that minimizes the selection
criterion. However, with 14 explanatory variables for each period and for each dependent
variable, the number of possible combinations is astronomical – 214∗(8+6) = 2196 possible mod-
els. Instead of exhaustively searching through all specifications, I use an iterative algorithm
to find the best model. The algorithm sequentially eliminates or adds explanatory variables
reducing the SSE in each step. A detailed description of the algorithm is in Appendix A.
The drawback of the in-sample selection method is similar to the critique of data mining
procedures. I am fitting Canadian dynamics “too closely,” picking up events that might be
random noise rather than features of spatial evolution. The Russian counterfactual thus in a
sense is “too Canadian.” But this is the nature and the main assumption of the counterfactual
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exercise, because there is no way to distinguish between random and systematic events by
observing just one realization of Canadian history.
Clearly, the minimum relative SSE model (and the minimum absolute SEE model) pre-
vents us from over-accumulating errors in the recursive forecast. Intuitively, the model selects
a set of explanatory variables that are strongly correlated with omitted unobservables. In
turn, we must keep in mind that the estimated coefficients of the model are biased away
from its true structural parameters. They describe correlations, but they do not imply any
structural interpretation.
6.3 Robustness
To ensure that the results I obtain are not driven solely by the specific model I select, I
estimate several different models, make projections on Russian/Soviet data, and compare
the results. Overall, my main message – that Siberia and the Far East are overpopulated and
overindustrialized – remains true for all the models. In addition to the main model (chosen
by relative SSE criterion, indexed by (1)) I look at the following models:
(2) A model, that minimizes the sum of the absolute squared errors (absolute SSE)
The next models, (3)-(8) are chosen without in-sample forecast evaluation, and they range
from simple to more complex.
(3) Naive extrapolation of the 1911 regional shares of population and industry onto 1991.
(4) All regional characteristics are included, but model parameters are fixed over time.
(5) Parsimonious model: only past levels of population and industry are included in the
regressions.
(6) Only past levels of population and geographical characteristics are included (no natural
resources or railroads).
(7) Complete model: all of the variables are included.
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(8) Model chosen by Akaike criterion: I reduce the complete model by consecutively ex-
cluding variables until the Akaike criterion is minimized.
Model (3) is the best guess about a counterfactual Russia if information about the spatial
evolution of Canada in the 20th century is not used at all. Model (4) predicts Russian/Soviet
population recursively based on Canadian dynamics, but is very restrictive. It implies that
a given factor affects the location of people or manufacturing in the same way throughout
the 20th century. Obviously, there is no theoretical reason to expect this.
For the rest of the models I relax this assumption. I calculate the results for models
(5)-(7) to demonstrate that there is no particular group of variables that drives my main
result. Finally, model (8) is chosen so as to minimize information criterion.
Another essential feature of a good forecast model is the absence of systematic spatial
bias. If the differences between projected and actual population values do not appear to be
spatially random, then the model is likely biased and should not be used. I calculate Moran’s
I statistics (with contiguity spatial weight matrix) for the forecast errors for Canada to check
for spatial autocorrelation. My results should also be examined for any apparent geographical
biases.
The next section presents in detail the results for the main model, compares the results
obtained via other models, and discusses their robustness.
7 Results
7.1 Projection models: performance in Canada
The summary results for all eight models are presented in Table 3. The top part of the table
summarizes the results of the projections for Canada (in-sample).
Rows a) and b) show the R2 measures for Canadian projections:
Absolute R2 = 1−
∑
l(Pop
A
l,1991 − PopFl,1991)2∑
l(Pop
A
l,1991)
2
,
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Relative R2 = 1−
∑
l
(
PopAl,1991−PopFl,1991
PopAl,1991
)2
N
.
Canadian population (absolute levels) is predicted reasonably well, even by the “naive”
extrapolations of 1911 (model (3)). The model places 86% of Canadian population where it
should be, which is not surprising, because major population centers in Canada (except for
western cities, such as Vancouver, Calgary, Edmonton) formed and grew prior to the begin-
ning of 20th century, and have retained their significance up to the present day. Canada’s
present population distribution is predicted well by its past distribution. Of course, more
sophisticated models fit the reality even more closely.
Practically all of the models predict Canada as “colder” than it actually is: predicted
TPC (row c)) is consistently below actual TPC. This suggests that in the Russian projections
the systematic error likely would be on the side of “colder” population allocation; i.e., it
would put more people into Siberia than should be there. Thus, if anything, my results
underestimate the degree of Soviet distortions. Moran’s test (row d)) cannot conclusively
find spatial autocorrelation in any but the most primitive models.
Figure 4 shows projection errors for the main model (1). Positive and negative errors are
distributed fairly evenly across the territory. There is no immediately visible bias either for
or against any particular part of the country.
The model is worse at predicting population in large metropolitan areas. Several regions
with major cities (Vancouver, Toronto, Montreal, Edmonton) have been growing rapidly
during the 20th century and have a strongly positive unexplained error: their actual popula-
tion is higher than projected. The other large cities (Winnipeg, Halifax, Ottawa, etc) have
either negative or near-zero errors. On average, the population of the largest metropolitan
areas is underestimated. But that should be expected from any model: locations with a
positive unexplained shock to growth have become leading metropolitan areas. Also, even if
systematic bias against large cities exists, it works against predicting more population in the
western part of Russia and toward predicting more population in the frontier east. Again,
this tends toward underestimation of the extent of Soviet distortions.
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7.2 Estimated Canadian dynamics: discussion
Tables 4 and 5 present the estimation results for the main model. What facts about Cana-
dian spatial dynamics can we take from the estimated coefficients? In particular, does the
common rhetoric about Soviet Siberian development fit the Canadian data? Do resource-rich
regions indeed provide easy access to primary materials, and hence attract manufacturing
and population?
Population equations
Given that the parameters are not structural, and that the number of parameters is
quite large for the sample size to provide valid inferences, it is still possible to make several
observations on Canadian spatial dynamics. First, the most important factor in population
growth is past level of population. This is not surprising: the spatial structure of the economy
is history-dependent and very inert. The urbanization rate in 1911 has a consistently positive
coefficient, suggesting that areas that were settled and urbanized prior to the beginning of
the century continued to attract people at a higher than average rate. Second, the coefficient
of land area is mainly positive, ceteris paribus indicating a diffusion process: people tend to
spread across the territory over time, rather than concentrating in large agglomeration points.
This pattern is quite plausible for the countries going through territorial expansion or, as
in the cases of Russia and Canada, settling sparsely populated territories. Third, resource-
rich regions do not accumulate population faster than the average region. Finally, variables
that proxy for trade possibilities – communications and the market potential (number of
railroads, route abroad and ports), which are presumably advantageous characteristics – by
themselves are not correlated with more rapid population growth. Most likely, the positive
influence of these factors is already built into past population levels.
Lagged industrial employment is also positive and significant for the middle part of the
century: i.e., population grew faster in industrialized regions. However, it is negative for
1921, and close to zero for 1931, 1941, and 1991. Poor quality of the 1981 employment
data may explain the zero coefficient in 1991. The 1931 and 1941 equations use 1911 data
for past industry in place of the missing 1921 and 1931, so the variation in coefficients
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is expected. An alternative explanation is that the 1911-to-1941 time period also covers
two major historical events: the massive migration to the Western provinces and the Great
Plains at the beginning of the century and The Great Depression of the 1930s. Thus, the near
zero or negative coefficients for lagged industrial employment and temperature might reflect
population movement away from industrial centers and to the regions with colder climates.14
Interestingly enough, in many time periods temperature itself is not a significant explanatory
variable. Movement of population towards warmer areas is explained well enough by other
factors, for example lagged population.
Industry equations
For industry, the role of lagged variables is reversed: lagged industry is now a significant
factor. Unlike population, area does not always have a strongly positive coefficient, and
lagged industry coefficients for different years can be either under or over one. Thus, it is
not clear whether industrial employment follows the same diffusion-type spatial dynamics
as population. Industry growth is correlated with the presence of infrastructure and better
market access: the number of railroads has a positive and significant coefficient in two
time periods. However, the natural resources variables have predominantly negative or
near-zero coefficients (with the coefficients for metal mining operations being significantly
negative). Thus, there is no evidence that resource-rich regions experience faster growth of
manufacturing; if anything, there is some evidence to the contrary.
In general, the results suggest that the most important factor that determines the spatial
distribution of population (or industry) today is past population (or industry) distribu-
tion. Most likely, this is because attractive features of locations have manifested themselves
through history: the best locations are the ones that are most densely settled. The spatial
patterns of population and industry look very stable.
14In addition to these considerations, it is not always possible to correctly compare the coefficient values
between time periods simply because different sets of variables are included in the equations for different
time periods.
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7.3 Projections for Russia
The difference between actual and counterfactual population levels (based on the main
model) is mapped in Figure 5. The east-west divide is evident on the map. As a rule,
the projected values of population in the western provinces are higher than the actual val-
ues, and they are lower than the actual in the eastern provinces. The degree of spatial
autocorrelation is striking: all of the underdeveloped regions are located in the western part
of the country. In the European part of the Former Soviet Union, there are only four ob-
servations with a predicted population that is distinctly lower than the actual, and one of
them is Moscow.
In the West in general, provinces around larger cities (St. Petersburg, and also the
capitals of the Union Republics, Kiev and Minsk) experience less of a population deficit in
per capita terms. The population of Moscow is underpredicted. The rapid growth of Moscow
in the 20th century comes from its being the capital of the Soviet Union. At the turn of the
century, Moscow was only the second largest city in the Russian Empire.
The fact that Central Asian regions exhibit excess population can be explained by cultural
factors: fertility rates in Central Asia and parts of the Caucasus are historically higher than
in the rest of the country. I attempt to correct for these differences in Section 7.4.
The eastern regions – Siberia, and especially the Far East – are noticeably overpopulated,
even though the predicted number for the Siberian population is very high. The main model
(1) predicts about 19 million people. In fact in 1989 these provinces hosted more than 34
million people,15, so there is an astonishing 14.5 million excess population east of the Urals.
Moreover, the situation in the Urals is no better: they are also overpopulated.
Of course, the mere fact that the predicted population for individual regions appears
to be over or under the actual level does not necessarily imply that the actual allocation
is systematically distorted. First, the forecast model is not 100% precise. Second, the
15In 1989 the total population in the oblasts of Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic east of the
Ural mountains was over 39 million. The difference is due to the fact that borders of imperial provinces I
work with do not coincide with Soviet oblast borders. For example, the Russian city of Omsk, and most
of modern Omsk oblast in the Russian Empire, belonged to Akmolinskaya province, a territory of which is
now divided between Russian Federation and Kazakhstan. Because of that, I could not use Akmolinskaya
province for my comparisons.
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projected population levels for the individual regions are very sensitive to the location of
the borders. Values for most of the regional characteristics are taken for the regional center,
but population is spread throughout the territory.16 If a large city is located near a regional
border, then a small change in administrative borders may lead to large changes in the
recorded regional population. Thus, even if Russian spatial allocation was produced by the
same data-generating process that we used for Canada, individual regions might seem to be
over- or underpopulated. However, we should expect that the differences between actual and
predicted values for the neighboring regions approximately cancel each other out, and that
the errors are spatially random, not systematic. Neither of these is true for Russia.
The main results are quite robust to the choice of model. The projected levels of pop-
ulation in the nine provinces of Siberia and the Far East for different models are reported
in Table 3, row d).17 Keep in mind that these results are likely biased towards Siberia, as
the Canadian projected TPC levels suggest. Russian TPC is consistently predicted above
actual, by 1.2 - 1.5◦C (row i)).
Compared to the “naive” model (3), the Canada-based models predict more population
in Russian Siberia. This is not surprising: Canadian spatial dynamics through the 20th
century was characterized more by diffusion than concentration. The western parts of the
country attracted population. The same growth through diffusion of population is predicted
for the Russian periphery. Nonetheless, overpopulation of Siberia and the Far East emerges
as a robust result, irrespective of model choice.
Results for manufacturing employment (row g)) are even more striking. Whereas pop-
ulation of the Russian east in the counterfactual world should be 30-40% lower, predicted
manufacturing share on average is only 1/3 of actual.
To determine whether the difference between actual and predicted population of the nine
provinces (row e)) is statistically different from zero, I conduct Monte-Carlo simulations.
They estimate the probability that the existing population of 34 million in the eastern part of
16The fact that empirical results may depend on the specific configuration of the spatial unit borders is a
known issue referred to as MAUP (modifiable aerial unit problem).
17On the map (Figure 3) they are numbered: 68(Tobolskaya), 69(Tomskaya), 63(Eniseiskaya), 65(Irkut-
skaya), 64(Zabaikalskaya), 62(Amurskaya), 70(Yakutskaya), 67(Primorskaya) and 68(Sakhalinskaya oblast).
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the country indeed could be generated by the “Canadian” model. I draw 1,000 sets of random
model coefficients (α’s and β’s), according to their estimated means and variance-covariance
matrix. For each set of coefficients, I conduct the projection exercise on Russian/Soviet data
and record the total projected population of the nine provinces. I then examine the sample
of 1000 projections and record the distribution quantiles. This procedure is asymptotically
equivalent to analytically evaluating the forecast error.
The lower 5% quantiles of the “excess” population in nine Russian provinces are reported
in row f). In all of the models, the 5% quantile is far above zero. The difference between the
actual and counterfactual populations is significant at a very high level of confidence.
7.4 Accounting for the WWII and fertility differences in the USSR
To what extent is the overpopulation of Siberia due to Soviet policy decisions versus exoge-
nous factors, that is the circumstances beyond the control of Soviet authorities? The single
most important historical event with an impact on the spatial pattern of Russia’s economy
is WWII. Any estimated overpopulation of Siberia and the Far East may be due to wartime
destruction and evacuation of the western part of the country.
Furthermore, there is noticeable overpopulation in the regions of Central Asia which can
be explained by traditionally high fertility rates in that area. Because it is important to
disentangle the effects of culture from the effects of Soviet policy, I modify the projections
procedure to try to account for these factors in this section.
WWII
WWII disproportionally affected the western regions of the country. The regions in the
European part of the USSR suffered destruction of infrastructure and loss of many lives. In
addition, a substantial number of strategically important enterprises, together with essential
personnel, were evacuated to safer places during the war – mostly to the Urals, Siberia, and
Central Asia.18
18“From July to November 1941, the equipment and machinery for more than 1,500 industrial enterprises
(including 1,360 defense enterprises) were shipped eastward in 1.5 million train-car loads. To build and then
stuff the Soviet defense plants, 10 million people – plant workers and their families – were relocated to the
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If detailed information on population losses, infrastructure destruction, and evacuation
efforts were available, it would be possible to account directly for the consequences of the
war. Unfortunately, the lack of relevant data is a major obstacle. Detailed information on
the evacuation efforts by the Soviet Government has not been published openly. Industry
employment data at a low level of geographical aggregation were not published, even for
peaceful times. The first post-war census of population in the Soviet Union took place in
1959. There is no way to obtain oblast-level data either on population loss or on loss of
industrial capacity due to the war. Thus, instead of tracking the actual impact of the war,
I try to construct an estimate of its long-run consequences.
According to the scattered evidence from various publications, Ukraine as a whole lost
about 20% of its population and Belorussia lost about 25%.19 The percentage loss of produc-
tive capabilities during WWII was not publicized in the Soviet Union, but from publications
of gross industrial production relative to 1913 it can be inferred that actual production fell
about 75% in the worst cases.20 The Center and South of the European part of the Russian
Federation were occupied for a shorter period of time, and people (as well as enterprises)
had more time to evacuate. As the result, the loss of lives and productive capabilities was
not as massive on average as in the westernmost regions of the Soviet Union.
To account for WWII, I take the projected population and industry values for the year
1941 and, instead of using them in the 1951 projections, I alter the values for those regions
that were occupied during the war. To do so, I reduce the population levels of all affected
regions by 25% and the industry employment levels by 75%. (That is, I am assuming that
75% of the productive infrastructure was destroyed and that 25% of the population was lost
East.” – Gaddy (1996), p. 133.
19The following data were reported in statistical publications during the Soviet period: Belarus total
population in 1939 was 8.9 million; losses of Belarus population during the war were more than 2.2 million
people. Source: “Belorusskaya SSR za 20 let (1944-1963)” (“Belorussia during 20 years” – a statistical
publication), Central Statistical Unit with the Government of Belorussian USR, “Belarus,” Minsk 1964.
Loss of only civilian population in Ukraine is reported as 16% of total. Source: “Ukraina za 50 rokiv”
(“Ukraine during 50 years”), Central Statistical Unit with the Government of Ukrainian USR, Kiev 1967.
20In Leningrad region, the reported production levels for 1940 and 1945 correspondingly were 8.9 and 2.3
times higher than in 1913. The loss of production capabilities due to war, therefore, is about 74%. Similar
figures are reported for Smolensk region. For Latvia and Estonia the losses are near 50%. Unfortunately,
these data are not given for all regions. Source: “Atlas SSSR,” Glavnoe upravlenie geodezii i kartografii,
Moscow, 1962.
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because of the war.)21 These figures are deliberately higher than the actual losses. I then use
these altered 1941 values for the 1951 projections. Equations (15) and (16) for 1951 become:
lnPopRusF1951 = β
Rus
1951 + βˆ
pop
1951 ln(0.75
wPopRusF1941 ) + βˆ
ind
1951 ln(0.25
wIndRusF1941 ) +
∑
k
βˆk1951x
k
1941,
(17)
ln IndRusF1951 = α
Rus
1951 + αˆ
pop
1951 ln(0.75
wPopRusF1941 ) + αˆ
ind
1951 ln(0.25
wIndRusF1941 ) +
∑
k
αˆk1951x
k
1941,
(18)
where w is a dummy indicator if the region was occupied during WWII. The rest of the
process is unchanged.
Implicitly embedded in this procedure is the assumption that any shock due to the war
has to be permanent. Because the coefficients of the dynamic relationship for the years after
1941 were not changed, I am imposing an equilibrium path onto the Russian economy which
had been shaken by a major shock. The results of this procedure overdramatize the situation
and overestimate the effect of war on a counterfactual market economy. From the work of
Davis & Weinstein (2002) and Brakman, Garretsen & Schramm (2004), we know that war
shocks tend to be transitory: people tend to rebuild destroyed cities and population levels
tend to rebound.22 Even in the absence of pure economic incentives, people tend to return
home, even if home was destroyed. In my WWII counterfactual this effect is completely
ignored.
On the other hand, given Russia’s size and higher transportation costs, it is possible that
the WWII shock might have had more severe long-term consequences. In Japan, people
moved out of cities to the countryside when running from war, but in Russia people moved
across the country. Thus it would be more costly for the Russians to move back to the
previous spatial allocation once the war was over than it was for the Japanese. Probably,
21It has to be noted that due to the relative nature of the multinomial logit model, reducing the (population
or industry) shares of one region automatically raises shares of the regions unaffected. Thus, the composite
effect of this artificial shock is even larger than nominal 25% and 75%.
22Interestingly, mean-reversion after the war shocks is not observed in socialist countries: Eastern Germany
and USSR. In the Soviet case, it is quite consistent with the policy: the most of the evacuated defense
enterprises not be moved back.
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neither the projection with zero-shock nor the projection with fully permanent shock will
produce the perfect counterfactual allocation: the truth lies somewhere in between. The
projections corrected for WWII therefore should be treated as an upper bound of the long-
run consequences of the war.23
Figure 6 presents the results of the projections.24 With the artificial shock included, the
difference between actual and projected population in Siberia and the Far East decreases
substantially: it falls to 9.6 million. Thus, the long-term effect of the war generously allows
for about 5 million more people in Siberia. However, the difference between actual and
projected population still remains statistically significant (at about the 99.5% level, according
to Monte-Carlo simulations)! Even with the (probably grossly exaggerated) war effect built
in, the estimated excess of population in Siberia and the Far East is too large to be generated
only by random error; it has to be the result of the deliberate policy by the Soviet authorities.
Fertility
In the late USSR fertility rates varied from 1.93 children per woman average in Estonia to
5.03 in Turkmenistan. If labor mobility were perfect, then the birth rate differences would
not affect the spatial distribution of the population in long-run: people would instantly re-
allocate (migrate) according to the economic incentives alone. This is not the case if mobility
is imperfect. For example, if people are more likely to migrate to parts of the country with
similar culture and/or ethnic composition, then the differences in fertility rates can have a
long-term effect on spatial population structure.
Obviously, ignoring such differences would skew the population projection results away
from the Central Asian republics and toward regions with lower natural population growth.
Historically, Russia had one of the lowest birth rates in the former USSR. Siberia had roughly
23Putting it a different way, in a reduced-form model the past levels of population carry the effect of
inherent location quality. Applying the shock to the reduced-form model, I am implicitly treating the
regions that suffered from war and lost population as if they were inherently undesirable (and therefore less
populated). In this case, the forecast from 1941 on is biased toward regions that were spared in war, i.e. it
exaggerates the war’s impact.
24The results are not particularly sensitive to magnitude of the shock. I used the range of percentage
decrease values, from 20% to 50% for population, and from 60% to 100% for industry. Only at the level of
50% loss of population and 100% loss of industry did I get a projected population for the Eastern regions
close to the actual level.
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the same (age-standardized) low birth rates as the European part of the Russian Federation.
Thus, correcting for fertility differences on average would decrease the estimated population
deficit in the European part of the country and increase the estimated population surplus in
Siberia and the Far East.
To account for fertility differences, and before plugging the past population levels into the
projection equations, I multiply them by the population growth coefficients that are specific
to a geographical location and time period. Equations (15) and (16) now become:
lnPopRusF1921 = β
Rus
1921 + βˆ
pop
1921 ln((1 + g)
10Pop1911) + βˆ
ind
1921 ln Ind1911 +
∑
k
βˆk1921x
k
1911, (19)
ln IndRusF1921 = α
Rus
1921 + αˆ
pop
1921 ln((1 + g)
10Pop1911) + αˆ
ind
1921 ln Ind1911 +
∑
k
αˆk1921x
k
1911, (20)
where g is the annual natural population growth rate. The data on birth rates in the USSR
are consistently available only at the level of Union Republics, and for 1940 and then from
1960 on. Thus, I had to use the 1940 growth rates for the 1921-to-1951 projections.
The same critique applies here as with the WWII procedure: I am introducing exogenous
changes into the reduced-form relationship. The regions with higher population levels due
to high birth rates, and the regions that are historically more attractive to migration, are
going to be treated the same way. This procedure over-predicts the growth of high-fertility
regions. Thus, the results of this exercise are an upper bound on what could be the result
of fertility (and mortality) differentials.
The projection results are shown in Appendix B in Tables 7 and 8, and on Figures 7
(without WWII simulations) and 8 (with WWII simulations). The summary of the modified
projections for the main model and for the alternatives is in Table 2.
7.5 Temperature per capita dynamics
The trajectories of the actual and projected TPC in Canada and in Russia are shown in
Figures 9 and 10. The plot of the Canadian TPC trajectory (Figure 9) shows that forecast
models are somewhat “colder” than reality. This is probably an artifact of the large negative
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Excess population in 9 provinces, thousand
Correction
Correction Correction for WWII
Model No correction for WWII for fertility and fertility
Main result
min. relative SSE (1) 14 576 9 563 17 583 14 012
(9 783) (3 676) (13 036) (8 760)
Alternative models
min. absolute SSE (2) 17 291 12 471 19 677 16 172
(13 359) (6 199) (14 876) (10 553)
Akaike (8) 13 731 5 680a 16 415 10 403
(8 812) (-531) (12 246) (5 098)
lower 5% simulated quantile in parentheses;
a - significant at 10% level, but not on 5% level
Table 2: Excess population in 9 provinces of Siberia and the Far East, adjusted projections.
error for several major cities. The population of Vancouver is severely underestimated;
the Vancouver error alone is enough to account for the 0.15 degree actual-projected TPC
difference. If this bias were corrected, the forecast for Russia would be even “warmer”.
Generally, the trajectory of counterfactual Russian TPC mirrors the Canadian dynamics.
In Canada, TPC dips around the years 1920-1940, then rises steadily until 1990. At the
beginning of the century, after the construction of the Trans-Canadian Railroad, settlers
rushed to Alberta and Saskatchewan, drawn by an abundance of fertile land. Aggregate
temperature dropped slightly as the colder areas were populated. Later, as agricultural
technologies became less labor intensive, and as the share of agriculture in Canadian GDP
fell, the population shifted towards manufacturing centers, away from agricultural areas, and
the TPC went up.
At least by TPC dynamics, similar processes were taking place in the late Russian Empire
- early USSR. Peasant migration to Siberia of the beginning of 20th century, depopulation
of major cities during the October revolution, and civil war together led to comparable
growth of the frontier regions in Russia. Up until 1940, actual and counterfactual trajecto-
ries for Russia were practically the same. A noticeable divergence begins after WWII, when
the counterfactual model predicts a TPC “reversal” a la Canada. The actual Russia never
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started to “warm up.” While in Canada (and in the counterfactual Russian model) after the
1930s the productive resources became concentrated in regions already established as manu-
facturing and service centers, for Soviet Russia there was instead continued development of
its frontier.
In Figure 10 the shaded area represents the 95% confidence interval around the predicted
TPC trajectory (without corrections for either fertility or war). The permanence of the
artificial WWII shock is also evident from the graph: the TPC trajectories “with” and
“without” war do not converge; the gap widens over time. Although grossly exaggerated,
the effect of WWII still does not explain the entire actual-predicted TPC gap. Actual TPC
remains well below all of the possible counterfactual estimates.
8 Conclusions
I show that the present allocation of population and industry in Russia inherited from the
Soviet system is far different from what would have occurred in the absence of Soviet location
policy: it is colder and further to the east. The Eastern part of the country is overpopulated
by about 14.5 million people compared to the counterfactual market allocation. This result
is robust to the model selection.
The impact of WWII, however drastic in the case of Russia, only partly explains the east-
west imbalance. Even according to the most liberal estimates and with the war adjustment,
excess population in Siberia and the Far East remains at a level above 9.6 million and is
statistically significant.
With the transition to a market economy, and as agents have been able to freely respond
to market stimuli, it might have been hoped that the spatial inefficiency would eventually
correct itself, that is, that people would migrate to more favorable places. Indeed, beginning
in the early 1990s internal migration patterns reversed in post-communist Russia. People
started to leave the North, the Far East, and Eastern Siberia. Two of the most remote
territories with unbearable climate – Magadan oblast and Chukotka republic – lost 30-40%
of population during the transition years. Still, even at that uncommonly high rate of out-
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migration, it would have taken 50-60 years at a minimum to revert to the counterfactual
population levels in these territories.
By the end of 1990s, this return migration outflow from the “Far North” gradually
decreased to a minimal level. It is now clear that the reversal of Soviet location policies
will not happen in the foreseeable future. At the current migration rate, a return to the
counterfactual spatial allocation would take about 180 years. Thus, the costs of spatial
inefficiency will be an extra burden for Russian Federation for years to come.
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A The search algorithm for choosing the best model
The algorithm for choosing the best model works as follows:
Step 1 Choose the “core” set of variables – i.e. the ones that definitely are going to be included into
the model. In our case, the past values of population and industry, area and the constant
term have to be included. This narrows down the number of variables “in question” from
224 to 168.
Step 2 Start with the model with all variables included. Drop one of the 168 “questionable” variables
from the regressions and estimate the restricted model. Perform a forecast on Canadian data
and evaluate it according to a chosen criterion. If the forecast is better without the variable
- drop it, if worse - keep it. Repeat the procedure for all remaining non-core variables
consecutively.
Step 3 Take the model that resulted from step 2. Now try to add explanatory variables and check if
inclusion of any of them improves the forecast. If it does, put a variable back into regressions.
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Step 4 Repeat steps 2 and 3 until no more inclusions or exclusions can be made that would improve
the dynamic forecast. A local minimum for the chosen criterion is found.
Procedure necessarily converges, since at every step the value of SSE is decreased. Of course,
there is no guarantee that the procedure finds the global minimum of SSE. If there exist several
local minima that correspond to the different non-nested models, it is possible that algorithm finds
one of those models, not necessarily the best one.
Step 5 Change the order of “questionable” variables and repeat steps 2 to 4, examining the variables
“in question” in different order. If the procedure finds a different local maximum (a different
set of variables), compare it with the one found previously and pick the better one. Repeat
several times.
Repeat steps 2 to 4, but with different starting point. For example, start with the model
that includes “core” variables only. As there are no more variables to drop, go directly to
step 3, then do as algorithm requires. If a different model results, compare it with the one
found previously and pick the best. Repeat with various starting points. If different local
minima are found, select the one with lowest SSE. 25
B Tables and figures
25Step 5 did not uncover a better alternative, i.e. in this case the minimum found in Step 4 is likely global.
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Dependent POP POP POP POP POP POP POP POP
Variable (ln) 1921 1931 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991
Populationt−1 1.097* 0.997* 0.982* 0.811* 0.861* 0.861* 0.957* 1.076*
(0.045) (0.035) (0.035) (0.041) (0.044) (0.052) (0.058) (0.045)
Manufacturingt−1 -0.143* -0.007 0.001 0.117* 0.093* 0.079* 0.010 -0.041
(0.033) (0.030) (0.022) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034) (0.043) (0.031)
Area 0.048* 0.055* 0.031* 0.045* 0.048* 0.066* 0.043* 0.011
(0.016) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.012) (0.015) (0.019) (0.013)
Temperature 0.007 0.009* 0.001 0.008* 0.012* 0.000
(0.007) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Distance to Toronto 0.000 -0.066* 0.008 -0.011
(0.000) (0.026) (0.025) (0.023)
Railroadst−1 0.030* -0.010 -0.005 -0.010 -0.014
(0.017) (0.013) (0.012) (0.011) (0.013)
Coal miningt−1 0.043 0.002 0.029
(0.046) (0.043) (0.043)
Metals miningt−1 -0.021 0.005 0.113* -0.020 -0.046
(0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.047) (0.049)
Oil extractiont−1 -0.042 -0.060 0.092* -0.036 0.087*
(0.076) (0.068) (0.056) (0.054) (0.044)
Timber cutting 0.150* 0.030 -0.005
(0.049) (0.048) (0.038)
Port -0.043 -0.050 -0.040 -0.035 -0.069 -0.054 -0.016
(0.041) (0.041) (0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.040) (0.039)
Trade route -0.016 0.010 -0.014 -0.065 -0.072 -0.029
(0.045) (0.049) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043)
Agricultural land -0.035 0.060
(0.051) (0.044)
Urbanization, 1911 0.212 0.343* 0.172 0.263* 0.276* 0.251* 0.228*
(0.142) (0.172) (0.121) (0.096) (0.129) (0.136) (0.139)
Number of observations=279, parameters = 77, R2=0.99.
Standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significance at 90% level.
Table 4: Estimation results for the main model. Equations for population.
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Dependent IND IND IND IND IND IND
Variable (ln) 1941 1951 1961 1971 1981 1991
Populationt−1 0.735* 0.070 -0.077 0.139 -0.089 0.552*
(0.077) (0.080) (0.096) (0.114) (0.124) (0.095)
Manufacturingt−1 0.248* 0.938* 1.095* 0.875* 1.173* 0.509*
(0.073) (0.068) (0.073) (0.075) (0.085) (0.059)
Area 0.167* 0.041 0.095* 0.041 0.105* -0.062*
(0.040) (0.036) (0.037) (0.034) (0.037) (0.024)
Temperature 0.030* 0.033* 0.019*
(0.011) (0.009) (0.010)
Distance to Toronto -0.326* -0.006 0.231* -0.206*
(0.067) (0.061) (0.051) (0.047)
Railroadst−1 0.075* 0.020 0.065* -0.013
(0.030) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026)
Coal miningt−1 0.045 0.040 0.106 -0.067
(0.101) (0.091) (0.105) (0.092)
Metals miningt−1 -0.315* -0.211* -0.402*
(0.128) (0.107) (0.101)
Oil extractiont−1 -0.004 0.010 -0.207 0.014
(0.158) (0.131) (0.133) (0.111)
Timber cutting -0.022 0.200* -0.183* -0.059
(0.109) (0.085) (0.097) (0.098)
Port -0.093 -0.128 -0.038*
(0.094) (0.083) (0.089)
Trade route -0.061 -0.131 -0.076 -0.200*
(0.103) (0.073) (0.101) (0.090)
Agricultural land -0.113 -0.199 0.051 -0.275*
(0.099) (0.111) (0.100) (0.091)
Urbanization, 1911 1.435* 0.091 0.561*
(0.353) (0.316) (0.269)
Number of observations=180, parameters=58, R2=0.98
Standard errors are in parentheses. * indicates significance at 90% level.
Table 5: Estimation results for the main model. Equations for manufacturing.
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Projected Actual Actual to
population, population, Difference, projected
Region thousands thousands thousands ratio
Alberta north 1115.9 1268.6 152.7 1.14
Alberta central 1021.2 1063.5 42.3 1.04
Alberta south 234.0 213.4 -20.6 0.91
BC coast 965.8 679.6 -286.2 0.70
Kootenay 314.2 176.3 -137.9 0.56
Vancouver area 1174.7 1833.0 658.3 1.56
Yale and Cariboo 455.0 593.2 138.2 1.30
Manitoba center 126.1 80.5 -45.6 0.64
Manitoba sw 109.2 47.9 -61.2 0.44
Manitoba south-center 253.7 152.0 -101.7 0.60
Manitoba south-east 786.9 747.3 -39.5 0.95
Manitoba north 61.1 64.2 3.1 1.05
New Brunswick north west 179.8 165.7 -14.1 0.92
New Brunswick south 411.3 346.7 -64.6 0.84
New Brunswick east coast 186.3 211.5 25.2 1.14
Nova Scotia west 901.5 657.7 -243.9 0.73
Nova Scotia east 594.2 242.3 -351.9 0.41
Toronto area 4564.4 5897.1 1332.7 1.29
Ontario south 1594.8 1235.9 -358.9 0.77
Ottawa area 1493.0 1219.0 -274.0 0.82
Ontario center 1177.8 910.5 -267.3 0.77
Ontario north 925.2 581.9 -343.3 0.63
Ontario north-west 601.3 240.6 -360.7 0.40
PEI 120.7 129.8 9.1 1.08
Montreal and around 2245.6 3442.3 1196.7 1.53
Quebec south 752.5 861.5 108.9 1.14
Quebec city and around 596.0 842.8 246.8 1.41
Quebec center 415.4 377.8 -37.5 0.91
Quebec east 430.8 331.0 -99.8 0.77
Quebec north east 616.7 417.0 -199.7 0.68
Quebec west 141.5 203.4 61.9 1.44
Quebec south-west 211.0 332.3 121.3 1.57
Saskatchewan south 786.4 426.4 -360.1 0.54
Saskatchewan center 366.8 337.8 -29.0 0.92
Saskatchewan north 352.6 224.8 -127.9 0.64
Yukon 26.9 27.8 0.9 1.03
N-W Territ 37.3 57.6 20.4 1.55
Newfoundland 861.5 568.5 -293.0 0.66
Table 6: Projected vs actual population. Canada, 1991. Main model (min relative SSE).
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Projected
Projected Projected population,
population, population, WWII and
Actual Projected WWII fertility fertility
Province population population adjusted adjusted adjusted
European provinces
1 Arkhangelskaya 2699.1 1088.1 1365.4 921.8 1119.3
2 Astrakhanskaya 1426.5 2383.9 2991.5 2019.6 2452.4
3 Bessarabskaya 4345.8 3682.0 2866.9 3615.5 2724.1
4 Vilenskaya 1977.2 2868.3 2233.3 2363.7 1780.9
5 Vitebskaya 2868.4 3628.2 2825.0 3443.3 2594.4
6 Vladimirskaya 1089.7 3350.7 4204.6 2838.5 3446.8
7 Vologodskaya 1970.2 5544.7 6957.9 4697.3 5703.9
8 Volynskaya 4037.9 5362.0 4175.1 4490.3 3383.3
9 Voronezhskaya 2734.1 3989.2 3106.1 3379.4 2546.3
10 Vyatskaya 3431.5 5469.3 6863.3 4633.4 5626.4
11 Grodnenskaya 1394.9 2991.8 2329.5 2839.3 2139.3
12 Oblast’ Voiska Donskogo 5424.8 5918.4 4608.3 5013.9 3777.8
13 Ekaterinoslavskaya 11286.0 4856.2 3781.2 4066.7 3064.1
14 Kazanskaya 3806.9 3860.2 4844.0 3270.2 3971.0
15 Kaluzhskaya 1066.8 2248.7 1750.9 1905.0 1435.4
16 Kievskaya 6170.8 7808.5 6080.0 6539.1 4927.0
17 Kovenskaya 2314.9 3145.7 2449.4 2592.3 1953.2
18 Kostromskaya 1425.2 2901.5 3641.0 2458.0 2984.8
19 Kurlyandskaya 917.0 1078.9 840.1 613.1 462.0
20 Kurskaya 2564.5 3452.7 2688.4 2925.0 2203.9
21 Liftlyandskaya 2006.3 2406.3 1873.7 1367.5 1030.4
22 Minskaya 4601.6 5890.1 4586.2 5589.9 4211.8
23 Mogilevskaya 2145.7 3409.6 2654.8 3235.8 2438.1
24 Moskovskaya 15682.4 12044.3 9378.1 10203.4 7687.9
25 Nizhegorodskaya 3336.9 2863.6 3593.5 2426.0 2945.8
26 Novgorodskaya 1454.6 3230.7 2515.5 2736.9 2062.2
27 Olonetskaya 892.4 907.2 706.4 768.6 579.1
28 Orenburgckaya 6421.7 3683.1 4621.8 3120.2 3788.9
29 Orlovskaya 2084.7 3534.4 2752.0 2994.2 2256.0
30 Penzenskaya 1773.2 1983.9 2489.5 1680.7 2040.8
31 Permskaya 7755.0 7153.5 8976.7 6060.1 7358.8
32 Podol’skaya 2660.9 5155.3 4014.1 4317.2 3252.9
33 Poltavskaya 2487.5 4866.4 3789.1 4075.3 3070.6
34 Pskovskaya 771.7 2377.6 1851.3 2014.2 1517.6
35 Ryazanskaya 1432.0 3592.5 4508.2 3043.4 3695.7
36 Samarskaya 4267.3 5170.0 6487.6 4379.8 5318.4
37 St. Peterburgskaya 6446.6 7855.9 6116.9 6655.2 5014.5
38 Saratovskaya 2117.7 4562.3 5725.1 3865.0 4693.3
39 Simbirskaya 2441.0 2191.4 2749.9 1856.4 2254.3
40 Smolenskaya 1211.2 3668.7 2856.6 3108.0 2341.7
41 Tavricheskaya 4916.7 3263.3 2540.9 2732.8 2059.1
42 Tambovskaya 2502.7 4294.4 5389.0 3638.1 4417.7
43 Tverskaya 1581.4 4129.1 3215.1 3498.0 2635.6
44 Tul’skaya 1891.4 2825.5 2200.0 2393.6 1803.5
45 Ufimskaya 4533.7 3990.1 5007.1 3380.3 4104.7
Table 7: Projected vs actual population in imperial province borders, according to the main
model (min relative SSE). The Soviet Union, 1989 (part 1).
48
Projected
Projected Projected population,
population, population, WWII and
Actual Projected WWII fertility fertility
Province population population adjusted adjusted adjusted
European provinces, cont.
46 Khar’kovskaya 4830.8 5352.8 4167.8 4482.6 3377.4
47 Khersonskaya 4524.1 4397.6 3424.1 3682.7 2774.8
48 Chernigovskaya 2317.2 4715.1 3671.3 3948.6 2975.1
49 Estlyandskaya 1037.9 487.7 379.7 264.2 199.1
50 Yaroslavskaya 1384.1 2207.7 2770.4 1870.3 2271.1
Caucasus
51 Bakinskaya 4158.6 1674.7 2101.5 2761.1 3352.8
52 Batumskaya 392.7 133.3 167.2 156.6 190.2
53 Dagestanskaya 1514.1 864.3 1084.5 1424.9 1730.3
54 Elisavetpol’skaya 2536.2 2301.0 2887.4 3793.7 4606.7
55 Kubanskaya 4929.3 6013.9 4682.7 5094.8 3838.7
56 Kutaisskaya 1441.9 1536.8 1928.5 1806.1 2193.1
57 Stavropol’skaya 1685.1 1986.0 1546.3 1682.4 1267.6
58 Terskaya 4209.6 3367.4 2622.0 5551.9 4183.2
59 Tiflisskaya 2898.9 3456.8 4337.8 4062.4 4933.0
60 Chernomorskaya 585.7 157.3 197.4 133.3 161.9
61 Erivanskaya 3582.8 1715.6 2152.9 3498.5 4248.3
Siberia and the Far East
62 Amurskaya 1333.4 498.0 625.0 421.9 512.3
63 Eniseiskaya 4244.4 3234.7 4059.2 2740.3 3327.6
64 Zabaikal’skaya 2496.1 1180.7 1481.7 1000.3 1214.6
65 Irkutskaya 2966.9 1675.9 2103.0 1419.7 1724.0
66 Primorskaya 5009.5 731.9 918.4 620.0 752.9
67 Sakhalinskaya 709.6 22.5 28.2 19.0 23.1
68 Tobol’skaya 6245.8 5688.5 7138.4 4819.1 5851.8
69 Tomskaya 10160.8 6112.0 7669.8 5177.8 6287.5
70 Yakutskaya 1081.4 527.3 661.6 446.7 542.4
Central Asia
71 Akmolinskaya 5449.1 2272.0 2851.0 3611.3 4385.3
72 Zakaspiiskaya 2424.1 1765.1 2214.9 3810.5 4627.0
73 Samarkandskaya 2290.9 2181.8 2737.9 5060.4 6144.8
74 Semipalatinskaya 2576.7 1866.8 2342.6 2967.4 3603.3
75 Semirechenskaya 6489.2 2211.0 2774.5 3920.6 4760.8
76 Syr-Dar’inskaya 7971.0 6433.8 8073.5 14922.1 18120.0
77 Turgaiskaya 1629.8 1522.6 1910.7 2420.2 2938.9
78 Ural’skaya 1102.0 2125.1 2666.7 3377.8 4101.7
79 Ferganskaya 10466.4 5948.8 7465.0 12310.0 14948.0
Table 8: Projected vs actual population in imperial province borders, according to the main
model (min relative SSE). The Soviet Union, 1989 (part 2).
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Figure 1: Isotherms: average January air temperature.
Figure 2: Change in TPC index in Russia, Canada (left scale) and USA (right scale).
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Figure 3: Administrative divisions in the Russian Empire and the borders of the Soviet
Union and Russian Federation.
Figure 4: Projected vs. actual population according to the main model, Canada 1991. (Num-
bers show the absolute difference between projected and actual population, in thousands).
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Figure 5: Projected vs. actual population according to the main model, USSR 1991. (Num-
bers show the absolute difference between projected and actual population, in thousands).
Numbers show the absolute difference between projected and actual population, in thou-
sands.
Figure 6: Projected vs. actual population, USSR. Accounted for WWII.
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Figure 7: Projected vs. actual population, USSR. Corrected for fertility differences (numbers
show the absolute difference between projected and actual population, in thousands.
Figure 8: Projected vs. actual population, USSR. Accounted for WWII and corrected for
fertility differences (numbers show the absolute difference between projected and actual
population, in thousands).
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Figure 9: Projected and actual TPC dynamics in Canada. Alternative models compared.
Grey area shows 95% confidence interval around the projected trajectory with no corrections.
Figure 10: Projected and actual TPC dynamics in Russia.
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